<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>AI Safety | Marcello Maugeri</title><link>https://marcellomaugeri.github.io/tags/ai-safety/</link><atom:link href="https://marcellomaugeri.github.io/tags/ai-safety/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><description>AI Safety</description><generator>Hugo Blox Builder (https://hugoblox.com)</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Tue, 13 Oct 2026 00:00:00 +0000</lastBuildDate><item><title>Adaptive Oversight Subversion</title><link>https://marcellomaugeri.github.io/project/adaptive-oversight-subversion/</link><pubDate>Tue, 13 Oct 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://marcellomaugeri.github.io/project/adaptive-oversight-subversion/</guid><description>&lt;p>A model which works on a long task might take actions which nobody sanctioned. For example, in a cyber-security task it might &lt;em>forget&lt;/em> that a system is out of scope, or deliberately attack it, because it became frustrated when it could not solve the task. A case of this kind is the
that the UK AI Security Institute reported during its cyber testing. To prevent that, a chain-of-thought (CoT) monitor reads the reasoning and the tool calls of the model at every step (inspired by Baker et al.,
), gives the step a suspiciousness score (inspired by Greenblatt et al.,
), and blocks it when the score is too high. However, a blocked model still has a task to solve. So this project studies how models react to a block, whether they try to evade the monitor, and which strategies they adopt.&lt;/p></description></item></channel></rss>